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Abstract 
This chapter discusses two financial markets — the carbon and weather markets 
— and their potential role in helping stakeholders address climate change more 
effectively. While this chapter focuses on how these markets can benefit the poor 
in developing countries, it also examines the major constraints that must be ad-
dressed before the poor can gain access to carbon and weather markets. It also 
suggests how governments and donors might effectively facilitate sustainable car-
bon and weather market activity in developing countries.  
Poor households in developing countries are particularly vulnerable to weather 
shocks. To the extent that climate change may make such shocks more frequent, 
weather shocks and climate change are particularly troublesome given that propor-
tionally more of the poor live in marginal areas and under marginal conditions. Fur-
thermore, many of the world’s poor rely on rain-fed agriculture with limited ability 
to adapt to climate change (Corbera et al., 2006; Nicholls et al., 2007; Stern, 2006). 
What is not understood are the specific impacts climate change will have at sub-
regional or local levels; therefore, planning for these future events remains a chal-
lenge for households, firms, and policy makers (IPCC [International Panel for Cli-
mate Change], 2007a; Lobell et al., 2008; Morton, 2007). 
Climate change projections depend on a variety of assumptions made by re-
searchers regarding uncertain future weather patterns and feedback effects of re-
duced emissions (Hare and Meinhausen, 2006; Hulme et al., 2001; Stern, 2006; 
Yohe, 2006). This uncertainty challenges stakeholders trying to prioritize their ef-
forts based on two overarching strategies for addressing climate change (IPCC, 
2007a): mitigation to reduce anthropogenic contributions to climate change; and 
adaptation to adjust to the physical impacts of climate change. The authors argue 
that investments in adaptation are probably more critical for developing countries 
than investments in mitigation. This argument is based on the faster payoff of 
these investments relative to investments in mitigation.  
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Carbon markets are a mitigation tool that uses price signals to reduce the over-
all rate of GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions. The right to emit GHGs is traded as a 
commodity on these markets. In theory, the use of price signals allows for the re-
duction of emissions at the lowest possible cost. Firms purchase carbon offsets 
when the cost of doing so is lower than the cost of changing production practices 
to meet emissions reduction regulations. Pricing pollution in this fashion also pro-
vides incentives for new technologies that will lower carbon emissions. The 
United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has led mitigation ef-
forts; the Kyoto Protocol establishes binding commitments for emissions reduc-
tions. Carbon markets have emerged from the mechanisms outlined in Kyoto and 
the specific regulations of the developed countries that have ratified Kyoto. Car-
bon markets primarily serve large firms in developing countries as these firms are 
the largest contributors to GHG emissions and must adhere to emissions reduction 
regulations (UNFCCC, 2007). 
Carbon offsets are the instrument used in carbon markets that is most directly 
relevant to developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol does not require developing 
countries to reduce emissions; however, they can participate in mitigation efforts by 
reducing their GHG emissions. Credits for emissions reductions are sold on carbon 
markets to firms in developed countries that must meet emissions standards, or in 
the case of the United States, firms that seek to acquire carbon offsets at lower prices 
as a hedge against future restrictions. Thus, carbon emitting firms in developed 
countries finance global mitigation efforts. Large firms in China, India, and Brazil 
generate over 80 percent of the carbon offsets created through carbon offset projects 
in developing countries (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008). The UNFCCC, the World 
Bank, and others are working to build capacity in the least developed countries so 
that they can also participate in carbon offset projects (UNFCCC, 2007). 
Regarding adaptation, investments that reduce the vulnerability of the poor, es-
pecially infrastructure and new technology investments, are needed to manage the 
risk of specific climate change impacts. Many of these investments are badly 
needed irrespective of climate change. To be clear, weather shocks are common 
now and existing systems are vulnerable to those weather shocks. Climate change 
impacts will only serve to increase the vulnerability of the poor by increasing the 
frequency and/or severity of extreme weather events.  
Weather markets, such as for weather insurance and weather derivatives, en-
hance risk management strategies. They can serve as an adaptation tool to aid de-
cision makers at many levels by sending price signals regarding weather risk and 
by providing cash payments that can be used to adapt to changing climate impacts. 
Adaptation must occur in the form of a specific risk in a specific local context, 
which can require among other things changes in household production strategies 
(Fankhauser et al., 2008). Weather insurance reduces revenue volatility in weather 
sensitive industries. It may also serve as a tool to finance restoration of critical in-
frastructure that is designed to lessen the affects of extreme weather (e.g., levies, 
irrigation systems, etc.).  
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Weather index insurance is a relatively new form of weather insurance. It is 
gaining popularity in developing countries, creating new opportunities to protect 
the poor from the natural disasters that devastate their livelihoods and impede 
economic development (Barnett, Barrett, Skees, 2008). The most prevalent use of 
weather index insurance is for agriculture. Payouts are based on an important 
weather variable tied to agricultural production such as rainfall. Basing insurance 
payouts on an objective index reduces the loss adjustment and asymmetric infor-
mation costs of traditional agricultural insurance. Weather index insurance pro-
tects against catastrophic risk (e.g., drought), and relies on international reinsur-
ance markets to transfer the risk of extreme losses.  
Challenges remain in providing weather index insurance at rates affordable to 
poor households: 1) the start-up costs of developing attractive weather index in-
surance for the working poor create a significant barrier to entry for local insur-
ance companies; 2) insurance companies in developing countries are simply not 
ready to take on this special form of highly correlated risk, as they may have lim-
ited access to global reinsurers to transfer the risk out of the country; 3) insurance 
laws and regulations in developing countries are not in place to facilitate this spe-
cial form of insurance; and 4) in many regions, the underlying weather risks over-
whelm an insurance solution for risk management. 
Index-based weather risk transfer products can be written either as insurance or 
derivatives. Over-the-counter weather index derivatives are becoming more com-
mon. Over-the-counter products are typically developed for a single user and have 
many of the characteristics of insurance (e.g., a well-defined event that triggers a 
payment in exchange for a fixed premium payment). Still, due to the difficulties 
associated with regulating over-the-counter weather derivatives, these instruments 
should not be sold directly to small households. Insurance regulators in developing 
countries are in a much stronger position to protect consumer interest when these 
products are structured as insurance rather than derivatives — much progress has 
been made in creating the proper regulatory environment for weather index insur-
ance in developing countries (Carpenter and Skees, 2005).  
Actively traded weather derivatives are also playing an important role in 
weather risk transfer, such as heating and cooling days for major US cities. In con-
trast to over-the-counter weather index insurance products, which are tailored to 
each client, actively traded weather derivatives are standardized weather deriva-
tives contracts that are traded on financial exchange markets (e.g., the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange). Actively traded weather derivatives are typically designed 
for large energy firms in developed countries. Lessons from these markets may 
improve the development of markets for the poor because experience with weather 
derivatives on financial exchange markets illustrates that actively trading weather 
risk improves price discovery and creates more efficient pricing.  
Reinsurers that are actively involved in weather index insurance and weather 
derivatives markets are improving linkages between these markets to reduce the 
costs of weather index insurance. This may have important implications for devel-
oping countries, especially in regions where extreme weather events occur as a 
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consequence of specific, global weather anomalies such as El Niño Southern Os-
cillation (ENSO). Climate change presents additional challenges to weather mar-
kets, especially in designing sustainable weather index insurance products that are 
affordable for poor households. The authors make four primary conclusions re-
garding climate change and weather markets:  
1. when weather risk is increasing, weather markets can help stakeholders 
manage their associated revenue volatility; 
2. to be viable, someone will ultimately have to pay for the increasing risk 
through premiums for weather insurance, 
3. some public policy responses to higher premium costs such as premium 
subsidies can undermine the primary advantage of weather markets — pric-
ing the risk in a way that leads to more rapid adaptation strategies; and 
4. as risks increase due to climate change impacts, weather markets will con-
tinue to adjust the price of the underlying weather risk. Thus, in the long 
term, insureds pay for the cost associated with climate, and weather mar-
kets manage revenue volatility, not climate change. Insurers are uncertain 
about how climate change will affect the weather risk they are insuring; 
this uncertainty and the associated ambiguity creates upward pressure on 
the price of weather insurance.  
A climate market — a financial exchange of products that can hedge against fu-
ture climate risk — could potentially facilitate adaptation in several ways. These 
include alleviating some of the challenges climate change presents to weather in-
surance markets, which in turn could increase access to weather index insurance 
for the poor. By using financial exchange markets, the interaction of buyers and 
sellers would integrate myriad sources of information including climate change 
projections to develop a price for the risk under consideration. Such a market 
could reduce the pricing difficulties of insurers and allow firms, governments, and 
donors to hedge against extreme climate change effects.  
To illustrate, we provide the case of a potential ENSO index — a product to 
hedge ENSO risk. ENSO has a strong influence on global weather patterns (McPha-
den, 2003). Climate change effects on ENSO cycles would have economic impacts 
in many regions. Creating a short-term ENSO index that makes payments when El 
Niño events occur could help hedge the risk associated with ENSO, including the 
risk that climate change affects the ENSO cycle. Active trading in short-term climate 
markets could lead to trading longer-term climate risks, though it is fully acknowl-
edged that creating longer-term exchange markets has been an illusive goal for many 
commodities.  
As carbon and weather market activity increases in developing countries, a key 
question remains: to what extent will the poor be included in these markets? Cur-
rently, governments and donors are working to connect the poor to carbon and 
weather markets. The authors conclude that to increase the participation of the 
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poor in these markets and to improve their ability to address climate change, deci-
sion makers can a) improve incentives for the poor to mitigate emissions, b) use 
mitigation and adaptation funds to seed environmental finance markets (especially 
credit and insurance) for the poor, c) increase the role of the private sector in de-
veloping countries as intermediaries between the poor and these markets, and d) 
create climate markets that facilitate adaptation. 
1 Introduction 
Financial markets provide important tools. These range from basic financial ser-
vices such as credit, savings, and insurance, to more complex mechanisms such as 
derivatives, options, and securities, that can potentially help stakeholders address 
climate change more effectively. This chapter discusses the role of two financial 
markets — carbon and weather markets — and how these markets can benefit the 
poor in developing countries.1 The authors also examine major constraints that 
must be addressed before the poor can gain access to carbon and weather markets, 
and how governments and donors might facilitate these markets in developing 
countries.2 Recent applications in developing countries are used throughout as ex-
amples. 
The overarching strategy to address climate change occurs on two fronts: miti-
gaton and adaptation. Mitigation refers to efforts to reduce anthropogenic (man-
made) contributions to climate change. Adaptation refers to efforts to adjust to the 
physical impacts of climate change. (IPCC [International Panel for Climate 
Change], 2007a; Stern, 2006; UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change], 2007a). For financial markets, the distinction between miti-
gation and adaptation is important. 
Mitigation requires investments and behavioral changes that reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions (den Elzen et al., 2008). For example, improving energy ef-
ficiency among firms is a key mitigation effort that requires firms to change pro-
duction strategies and invest in new technology. As other chapters in this book ex-
plain, firms need capital for these efforts. Credit is one important financial mecha-
nism that facilitates mitigation. 
Likewise, adaptation requires investments and behavioral changes to adjust to 
risks created by climate change (Lobell et al., 2008); however, these risks can 
also increase revenue volatility as weather shocks disrupt production and de-
stroy assets (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007). Thus for adaptation, both credit to fi-
                                                          
1 Our focus is the working poor in developing countries. The majority of the working poor 
live in rural areas and operate small enterprises, in particular smallholder agriculture 
(World Bank, 2007). 
2 By framing the question in this fashion, this paper does not investigate the relative bene-
fits of a carbon market versus other choices for abatement. It is taken as a given that 
carbon markets will exist in some form in the future. 
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nance investments and behavioral changes, and insurance to manage weather 
risks and provide lump sum payments that may be used for adaptation invest-
ments, are important financial tools. For example, farmers may want to adjust 
their planting decisions or invest in irrigation due to erratic rainfall. They may 
need to purchase insurance for years of extreme drought when water shortages 
damage crops for non-irrigated agriculture and reduce access to water for irri-
gated agriculture (Leiva and Skees, 2008). 
In this chapter, carbon markets that finance mitigation and weather markets are 
discussed. These markets can facilitate adaptation by managing the financial con-
sequences of weather risk. The authors provide an overview that is relevant to the 
focus on how these markets might be better structured to serve the poor in devel-
oping countries. This chapter is divided into five sections: 1) setting the stage for 
how carbon markets aid mitigation and how weather markets aid adaptation to 
climate change; 2) a discussion of how carbon markets can be used by the poor; 3) 
a review of weather markets and how they may be used to facilitate adaptation by 
the poor; 4) an introduction some basic ideas about creating climate markets; and 
5) final comments about the intersection of carbon and weather markets.  
The authors view, developed later in this chapter, is that adaptation strategies 
will be more critical to the poor in developing countries than mitigation strategies. 
Also, weather markets are only one tool that may facilitate adaptation — and 
probably not the most important one.3 Given that weather insurance markets are 
being widely touted as an adaptation mechanism for climate change, weather mar-
kets are examined more thoroughly than carbon markets.4 Weather insurance is 
not climate insurance. Weather insurance is typically designed for a short time 
frame, often rainfall over the next year. However, longer-term climate change will 
have important implications for weather markets. The view emerging from climate 
change experts is that extreme weather events will occur more frequently in the 
future than in the past. If insurance underwriters also take this view, the price of 
weather insurance will rise. Consequently, these challenges may open the way for 
climate markets that would trade longer-term weather patterns. 
The final section of this chapter highlights the intersection of carbon and 
weather markets. Carbon markets provide an explicit linkage to adaptation 
through a rule that designates that a percentage of carbon market funds must be 
contributed to an adaptation fund that finances adaptation in developing coun-
tries (Müller, 2008; UNFCCC, 2007). Among other things, these funds could be 
applied to assist in developing weather markets. In addition to links between 
carbon markets and adaptation, which may be imposed institutionally, there may 
be important overlaps in the delivery systems for carbon and weather markets 
for the poor.  
                                                          
3 See Müller (2008) for a comprehensive review of how to fund these strategies. 
4 Weather markets can be structured as futures and/or options contracts traded on ex-
changes or as index-based insurance contracts. 
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2 Setting the Stage: Climate Change, Mitigation, Adaptation, 
and the Poor 
Developing countries are more vulnerable to extreme weather events than devel-
oped countries (Carter et al., 2007; Morton, 2007; Fankhauser et al., 2008; Stern, 
2006). The poor in developing countries are even more at risk, given where they 
live and that so many of them depend on rain-fed agriculture (Corbera et al., 2006; 
Nicholls et al., 2007; Stern, 2006). The poor tend to live where more affluent 
households choose not to settle — flood zones, vulnerable coastal areas, and re-
gions where frequent droughts occur — which are the areas most affected by ex-
treme weather events (Carter et al., 2007; Kundzewicz et al., 2007; Stern, 2006).  
Increased frequency of extreme weather events may be the most significant con-
cern associated with climate change (Corbera et al., 2006; Morton, 2007). Few mod-
els of the economic cost of climate change are adequate to examine the impact of 
extreme weather events (IPCC, 2007a). Most of this research is grounded in a 
framework that uses the expected values of important weather variables as the met-
ric for examining the benefits and cost of mitigation and adaptation (Fankhauser et 
al., 2008; Yohe, 2006). Despite this focus on average future conditions, concerns 
about the potentially negative impacts of climate change are growing (Bindoff et al., 
2007; Carter et al., 2007; IPCC, 2007a; Lobell et al., 2008). If increased frequency 
of extreme events could be modeled more effectively, the cost/benefit evaluation of 
mitigation and adaptation would probably change significantly.  
Addressing climate change requires both mitigation and adaptation (IPCC, 2007a, 
Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007; UNFCCC, 2007). Mitigation involves multiple policy re-
sponses targeted at the abatement of GHGs, primarily carbon dioxide.5 Adaptation 
involves a wide range of proactive and reactive strategies, both public and private, 
designed to buffer the adverse affects of climate change (Lacocq and Shalizi, 2007).6 
2.1 Climate Change and Uncertainty 
Uncertainty remains a significant challenge in preparing for climate change. Global 
circulation models inform climate change projections; however, these models are 
largely deterministic (primarily using trends in temperature from different climate 
                                                          
5 To avoid confusion, “mitigation” is used by those working on climate change to mean 
efforts focused on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. For those working on insur-
ance, mitigation means efforts to reduce the exposure to a hazard; which is referred to as 
“adaptation” by those working on climate change. We use the terminology adopted by 
the climate change community. 
6 Many definitions of adaptation (e.g., IPCC, 2007b) are more generic and account for 
behavioral changes associated with positive or negative climate change outcomes. For 
example, farmers in some northern temperate climates may experience a longer growing 
season and adjust farm practices accordingly. We focus exclusively on adaptation for 
negative climate change outcomes. 
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models) while many of their assumptions remain uncertain (Hulme et al., 2001; 
Yohe, 2006). For example, the costs and effectiveness of various mitigation poli-
cies are dependent on assumptions of economic growth, implementation of tech-
nological advancements, and consumption patterns (Hare and Meinhausen, 2006; 
Stern, 2006). Additionally, the feedback effects of reduced emissions on the global 
climate are uncertain; this uncertainty greatly challenges long-term predictions of 
the effects of climate change and estimates of the level of mitigation required 
(IPCC, 2007a; Stern, 2006). 
Preparation and prioritization of adaptation efforts should occur at sub-regional 
and local levels. However, climate change effects at a sub-regional level — and 
even a regional level for some variables such as rainfall — are nearly impossible 
to model (IPCC, 2007a; Lobell et al., 2008; Morton, 2007). For example, in 2007 
the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) reported that by 2020, between 
75 and 250 million people would experience increased water stress due to climate 
change in Africa. These kinds of general forecasts lack the specificity needed to 
plan adequate adaptation and safety net strategies (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007). Ad-
ditionally, projecting extreme events that have the largest impact on vulnerable 
populations, such as drought, extreme temperatures and rainfall, cyclones, etc., is 
more difficult than projecting average climate conditions (IPCC, 2007a). Nonethe-
less, the consensus view that extreme events will occur more frequently in some 
regions does require a public policy response to help the poor cope with extreme 
events (Corbera et al., 2006; IPCC, 2007a; Morton, 2007).  
Leading organizations (e.g., IPCC, UNFCCC, etc.) agree that mitigation and 
adaptation must play a significant role in adapting to climate change; however, 
given the many uncertainties, it is difficult to determine how to prioritize climate 
change policies (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007). Decisions regarding mitigation poli-
cies and adaptation investments impose real costs to households, firms, and gov-
ernments (Perkins, 2008). Governments and multilateral organizations increas-
ingly recognize the importance of a risk management approach to climate change 
policy that diversifies investments relative to the likelihood and severity of out-
comes (IPCC, 2007a; Yohe, 2006).  
2.2 Carbon and Weather Markets and Developing Countries 
Carbon and weather markets fit squarely into a portfolio of responses to climate 
change. Carbon markets are a mitigation tool that use price signals to reduce the 
overall rate of GHG emissions. In theory, price signals allow for the reduction of 
emissions at the lowest possible cost. Carbon markets use tradable pollution per-
mits to find least cost mechanisms to reduce emissions of GHGs. On the adapta-
tion side, weather insurance markets are expanding in developing countries, and 
Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC explicitly mentions insurance to encourage adaptation 
to climate change. Weather markets are an adaptation tool that can aid decision 
makers. For weather risk, this is accomplished through price signals and by provid-
ing cash payments that may be used by those affected to adapt to a changing cli-
mate. Recent climate change discussions have addressed the potential for developed 
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countries to assist developing countries in the creation of weather markets as a 
compensatory measure, given developed countries’ inordinate contributions to 
carbon emissions. Table 1 compares and contrasts some important issues of miti-
gation and adaptation that are relevant for carbon and weather markets. 
Table 1. Comparing and Contrasting Mitigation and Adaptation 
 Mitigation Adaptation 
Definition  Reducing anthropogenic contribu-
tions to climate change 
Reducing vulnerability to the 




Big emitters (e.g., energy-
inefficient firms, firms that reduce 
vegetation such as logging com-
panies, etc.) 
The most vulnerable (e.g., stake-
holders living in marginal areas, 
those with agricultural liveli-
hoods, low-skilled laborers, etc.)  
Geographic focus  Global  Sub-regional/local 
Timeframe  Long-term Short and/or long-term  
Can require that 
stakeholders 
Change production strategies 
Adopt new technology  
Change production strategies 
Adopt new technology 





Capital to finance investments 
Increase efficiency in emissions 
reductions 
Capital to finance investments 






Weather market (e.g., Weather 
insurance) 
Source: Authors  
Carbon and weather markets are different in many ways, but in developing coun-
tries these markets face similar challenges. Both markets are constrained by in-
adequately defined property rights or inappropriate regulatory policies. Delivering 
any market services to smallholders in remote locations is extremely costly. When 
transaction size is quite small, fixed transaction costs render it unprofitable to pro-
vide services to remote regions. In these situations, it may be more cost efficient to 
use an intermediary (e.g., a rural bank, donor organization, farmer cooperative, etc.) 
to aggregate carbon credits and weather insurance contracts. In some cases, a single 
entity may serve both markets. So far, donors and governments have been heavily 
involved in creating links between the poor and carbon and weather markets. In 
general, the private sector has limited incentives to foster these markets without 
government or donor help (Chapple, 2008). 
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Still, carbon and weather markets differ in a number of ways, including their 
origins, constructs, and reliance on government intervention. For example, carbon 
markets emerge when governments decide to impose restrictions on GHG emis-
sions, or if it is expected that these restrictions will be imposed. However, weather 
markets have emerged to manage risks associated with extreme weather events. 
Carbon and weather markets also differ because the primary benefits for develop-
ing countries are likely to be on the selling side of carbon markets and on the buy-
ing side of weather markets.  
3 Mitigation Using Carbon Markets 
Mitigation is a long-term strategy aimed at curtailing future climate change ef-
fects. GHG levels are measured on a global scale in terms of atmospheric concen-
trations (parts per million) of their CO2 equivalent (den Elzen et al., 2008; IPCC, 
2007a). IPCC (2007a) reports with “high agreement and much evidence” that 
given current climate change policies on mitigation, GHG emissions will continue 
to grow. The global community is establishing standards for measurement and 
verification that have opened the way for carbon markets.  
Since 1994, the UNFCCC has played a crucial role in efforts to mitigate GHGs. 
The Kyoto Protocol, enacted in 2005, created binding commitments for emissions 
reductions among participating developed countries. The thirty-seven countries 
that ratified the Kyoto Protocol commit to reducing greenhouse gases by roughly 5 
percent on average of 1990 levels over the 2008–2012 period (Capoor and Am-
brosi, 2008; UNFCCC, 2007).7 
The rules and structure of the Kyoto Protocol provide the foundation for domes-
tic, regional, and global carbon markets. A government places emissions caps on its 
producers so that it can meet its Kyoto emissions target, while markets have devel-
oped to facilitate emissions reductions in the private and public sectors.8 Carbon 
markets reduce the cost of emissions reductions in four ways: 1) enabling firms that 
cannot cheaply lower emissions to abate emissions in other ways; 2) enabling 
cleaner and more efficient companies to profit from their contributions toward re-
duced emissions; 3) connecting buyers and sellers to reduce transaction costs; and 
4) providing incentives for innovation in improved technologies that will lower 
emissions (UNFCCC, 2007).  
                                                          
7 Some economies in transition, such as those of the former Soviet Union, do not use 1990 
as a target year. 
8 The European Union-15 acts somewhat as a unit and has more flexibility than the coun-
try description provided here. 
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Kyoto establishes standards and mechanisms by which countries can mitigate 
their emissions.9 For example, one influence on a country’s emissions target is its 
level of vegetation that can act as a carbon sink — categorized as land use, land-
use change, and forestry (UNFCCC, 2007). The basic idea is that developed coun-
tries can meet the targeted level of emissions in a number of ways (den Elzen et 
al., 2008). By creating a market to trade emission rights, emitters can adopt new 
technology that will lower their emissions, or they can purchase carbon offsets as 
a way to pay for the excess GHGs they emit.  
Successful efforts to create this form of pollution trading with sulfur dioxide in 
the United States led the way for the development of carbon offset markets. Al-
though the Kyoto Protocol promotes carbon markets, developments in the United 
States have demonstrated that a voluntary market can emerge, for example the 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), even when the host country (the US) has not 
ratified the Protocol.  
CCX members commit to a voluntary but binding emissions reduction of 6 per-
cent of 1998–2001 levels by 2010. Because the voluntary carbon market is not 
governed by UNFCCC, some of its standards and guidelines differ, e.g., for car-
bon offset projects. Comparing the CCX to the European Union Emissions Trad-
ing Scheme (EU ETS) illustrates how the price to emit is clearly driven by the 
standards, rules, and units of trade on these exchanges. In 2007, for example, the 
EU ETS price ranged from USD 13 to USD 35 per carbon dioxide ton equivalent 
(tCO2e), while the CCX price was roughly USD 3 per tCO2e.  
Carbon markets have grown significantly from USD 11 billion in 2005 to USD 
65 billion in 2007. Of the USD 65 billion in carbon market volume in 2007, the vast 
majority of trades occurred in the EU ETS (USD 50 billion). The CCX accounted 
for only USD 72 million and the Australian New South Wales Exchange accounted 
for USD 224 million (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008). A large institutional infrastruc-
ture has emerged to support carbon markets, brokers, firms that monitor and evalu-
ate projects, advisors and consultants guiding carbon reduction projects, official ex-
change-markets, etc. Increasing financial sophistication is enabling firms to manage 
risks in the carbon market and more effectively plan for their carbon costs.  
Kyoto Protocol commitments expire in 2012, creating uncertainty regarding the 
standards and mechanisms in place after 2012. This uncertainty is affecting carbon 
markets, especially projects and financial instruments that plan for carbon mitiga-
tion in the longer term (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008). Without more certainty, the 
price of carbon will decline significantly. The largest source of volatility in carbon 
market prices is the uncertainly surrounding the rules that are imposed on allow-
able emissions (caps) and allowable offsets that create the opportunity to trade.  
                                                          
9 Greenhouse gas emissions and credits are measured in units of one ton of carbon dioxide 
equivalent: e.g., methane reductions are measured in terms of their carbon equivalent. 
The term “carbon markets” comes from this measurement. Carbon markets also include 
other greenhouse gases recognized by the Kyoto Protocol. 
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3.1 Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs): The Potential for 
Developing Countries 
Entities in developed countries can sell carbon emissions allowances to each other, 
or they may purchase carbon offsets created through GHG abatement projects in 
developing and transitioning countries. Most relevant for our discussion are car-
bon offsets from GHG abatement projects — Clean Development Mechanisms 
(CDMs) under the Kyoto Protocol. CDMs specifically target projects in develop-
ing countries where carbon caps and targets do not exist (UNFCCC, 2007). CDMs 
were developed, in part, because developing countries reported that they were be-
ing largely excluded from Kyoto’s efforts (Bozmoski, Lemos, and Boyd, 2008).  
CDMs must lead to real and measurable climate benefits. An underlying metric 
for CDMs is the principle of additionality — investments must fund emissions re-
ductions or carbon sinks that would not have occurred otherwise. New types of 
mitigation projects (new “methodologies”) are carefully managed by the CDM 
Executive Board — these projects must be funneled through the board of 10 
members for final approval. CDMs require approval by all countries involved, and 
baseline estimates must follow approved methodologies, rigorous monitoring and 
evaluation, and quality control checks by authorities (UNFCCC, 2007). Critics of 
CDMs say the rules are too complex and change too often, resulting in increased 
regulatory risk. They also argue that the transaction costs of CDMs are too high 
(Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008).10 
CDM transactions in 2007 were sold and traded for a value of roughly USD 13 
billion; of that total, USD 7.4 billion were primary issuances of CDMs. China cap-
tured 73 percent of CDM transactions. India and Brazil were second and third in 
terms of CDM transactions, with 6 percent of the CDM market each. Africa as a 
whole accounts for 5 percent of CDM transactions. Energy efficiency projects 
such as those reducing emissions of a power plant dominated CDM transactions 
(40 percent of volume, Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008). 
Mitigation efforts focus on the biggest GHG emitters and rapidly industrializ-
ing countries, such as China, that capture most of the benefits of CDMs. CDMs 
are intended to have the dual role of reducing emissions and creating sustainable 
development. CDM projects are much more concerned about regulating their 
emissions reductions than about their contributions to sustainable development. As 
a result, academics, NGOs, practitioners, and policymakers have accused CDM 
projects of emphasizing mitigation to the detriment of sustainable development 
(Bozmoski, Lemos, and Boyd, 2008; Chapple, 2008). The data support this con-
tention to some extent, given that by 2012, 75 percent of CDM projects are ex-
pected to operate in China, India, or Brazil, while only 1 percent are expected to 
occur in sub-Saharan Africa (Bozmoski, Lemos, and Boyd, 2008).  
                                                          
10 Capoor and Ambrosi (2008) report that firms that finance their own mitigation invest-
ments are more likely to pursue CDM projects. In contrast, firms that are unable to make 
mitigation investments without CDM financing are less able to bear the long delays and 
high transaction costs associated with the CDM review process. 
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After its initial implementation of CDMs, the UNFCCC (2007) quickly noted that 
developing countries could not participate equally in capturing CDM projects. Since 
then, UNFCCC has worked with the United Nations Development Programme, the 
United Nations Environment Programme, the World Bank Group, and the African 
Development Bank to engage in capacity building so that more developing countries 
participate in CDM projects. The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (CFU) and the 
Global Environment Fund (GEF) hope to include more developing countries in car-
bon funds that are relevant to their situations (UNFCCC, 2007). 
The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (CFU) 
The CFU leverages capital from carbon funds to engage in mitigation projects con-
sistent with the larger sustainable development agenda of the World Bank. Carbon 
funds are publicly or privately supported and are intended to facilitate mitigation 
projects. The CFU includes a variety of carbon funds, such as the BioCarbon Fund, 
the Community Development Carbon Fund, and the Italian Carbon Fund. Fund par-
ticipants purchase reductions of GHG emissions from these projects. The CFU acts 
as an honest broker between carbon offset buyers in developed countries and sellers 
in developing countries. The CFU also engages in capacity building in developing 
countries. It has created the first emissions reductions projects in several developing 
countries (CFU, 2006) that are not big GHG emitters. 
Because the CFU works within the Kyoto framework, emissions mitigation 
must be a component of every project. Where possible the CFU also links into lar-
ger-scale World Bank projects designed to have sustainable outcomes. Some of 
the projects under the CFU engage in complementary mitigation, adaptation, and 
development efforts. For example, a CFU project supports the reforesting of 
10,000 hectares of degraded land with gum-producing acacia trees in Mali (CFU, 
2006). Part of this land will be managed by farmers who will receive training in 
sustaining the plantation while harvesting gum. Additionally, technical assistance 
will be provided on how to intercrop cowpeas, groundnuts, and other crops among 
the new trees. This project should 1) create a carbon sink through reforestation 
which is expected to sequester 1.5 million tCO2e by 2035; 2) improve soils by in-
creasing nitrogen levels and reducing water and wind erosion; and 3) create sus-
tainable livelihoods for Malian farmers. 
The Global Environment Fund (GEF) 
The GEF was established in 1991. It funds projects in developing countries that 
have environmental benefits in coordination with the UNFCCC. This fund has 
leveraged USD 8.2 billion toward environmentally beneficial projects in develop-
ing countries. The UNFCCC Marrakesh Accords in 2001 created an emphasis on 
adaptation, especially for work that complements mitigation, and expanded oppor-
tunities for funding adaptation under the GEF. For example, the GEF now man-
ages adaptation projects through a special Least Developed Countries Fund. This 
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fund has support exceeding USD 100 million. Also, the Adaptation Fund for de-
veloping countries was created, supported by CDM projects. Two percent of pay-
ments for offsets from CDM projects are paid into the Fund. (UNFCCC, 2007). 
As part of the GEF Small Grants Programme, farmer groups in Tanzania living 
near Lake Victoria received grants to develop wind-powered irrigation systems. 
Citing increased agricultural pollution in Lake Victoria, local stakeholders created 
drawing points for local communities to irrigate farms and water livestock. These 
points were selected to reduce pollution. Grants from the GEF created access to 
wind-powered irrigation systems, tools and skilled labor, and funded capacity 
building to train community members to operate and install them. Farmer groups 
provided in-kind labor to install the irrigation systems. As a result, communities 
received water at lower cost and with lower GHG emissions than those using elec-
tric- or gasoline-powered irrigation systems. Agricultural pollution in Lake Victo-
ria has decreased and some farmers report more than doubled crop production as a 
result of access to local water (GEF, 2008).  
Carbon Offsets on the CCX 
Understanding carbon prices and regulatory differences between the EU ETS 
and voluntary markets such as the CCX is important for stakeholders planning 
carbon offset projects in developing countries. The CCX relies on independent 
sources for verification and monitoring of practices used to offset carbon emis-
sions, which tend to require less rigorous regulation than UNFCCC standards. 
As a result, some projects are financed through the CCX until they can obtain 
UNFCCC approval. This can take as long as nine months after a project is certi-
fied by the UNFCCC, and perhaps longer for new methodologies. It can then 
move to the EU ETS, where it will receive a higher price for carbon offsets. 
Thus, the CCX provides a “bridge” to facilitate development for some carbon 
offset projects. In other cases, the standards for voluntary markets accommodate 
projects on the CCX that are ineligible for CDM status because they are difficult 
to monitor, but they may create important emissions reductions such as projects 
preventing deforestation, (Chapple, 2008). 
A project selling carbon offsets on the CCX that contributes to sustainable de-
velopment illustrates the potential of carbon offset projects outside the Kyoto 
framework. Andhyodaya, an NGO in southern India, connects smallholder farmers 
to the CCX. This project encourages farmers to use biogas digesters — small en-
ergy generators powered by animal manure and/or agricultural residues such as 
organic kitchen waste. These biogas digesters are primarily used to heat water and 
for cooking with gas. These produce less carbon emissions than generators pow-
ered by fossil fuels or that use wood for fuel that is not replanted. Biogas digesters 
are also 55 percent more efficient than wood burning stoves (CCX, 2007).  
Because of the mitigation benefits, this project is funded through carbon credits 
sold on the CCX, and farmers are paid when these credits are bought. Over 15,000 
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farmers participated in the initial project phase, receiving roughly USD 1.2 million 
in gross revenues from 2003 to 2006, or roughly USD 27 per year per farmer. 
During the second phase, in progress in 2008, roughly 113,000 farmers were ex-
pected to displace 500,000 tCO2e, in aggregate receiving USD 2 million per year 
or roughly USD 18 per year per farmer. Participants in the program are given car-
bon vouchers that can be cashed at any branch of the Federal Bank of Kerala, 
which partnered with the project.  
Beyond the mitigation benefits associated with this project, the cleaner, more 
efficient biogas digesters reduce respiratory and eye problems associated with us-
ing traditional firewood; they also have the potential to increase household pro-
ductivity as household members no longer have to travel to collect firewood. Ad-
ditionally, manufacturing biogas digesters requires relatively low up-front invest-
ments, such that manufacturing plants could potentially be installed in remote ru-
ral areas (CCX, 2007). 
The noteworthy feature of this type of project is that it may start spontaneously 
without donor support. Manufacturers of these forms of technology could poten-
tially team with carbon aggregators to facilitate the joint sale of biogas digesters 
and carbon credits.  
Creating Efficient and Scalable Mitigation Projects 
As the projects described above illustrate, some mitigation technologies have im-
mediate positive externalities for households, such as better air quality in the 
home. Stakeholders, especially donor organizations, are puzzling through the chal-
lenges of creating efficient and scalable projects using these technologies. Two 
considerations are noteworthy in this regard: the use of microfinance to increase 
household access to mitigation technologies and the size of carbon offset revenues 
for mitigating the emissions of poor households. (Box 1 profiles a successful ex-
ample of a project that links mitigation technology for rural households, microfi-
nance, and carbon markets.) 
Box 1: Grameen Shakti: Microfinance and Energy Efficiency 
Grameen Shakti (a subsidiary of Grameen Bank) provides energy-efficient 
technology to rural households in Bangladesh through microfinance (Chhabara, 
2008; Grameen Shakti, 2007). Grameen Shakti sells solar and biogas energy 
systems and energy-efficient cooking stoves (Grameen Shakti, 2007). The so-
lar-powered energy system has been the most popular item sold; consumers 
can choose among units that power from 10 to 75 watts. Households typically 
purchase the 50-watt system, which sells for USD 400 and can power a TV, 
radio, cell phone charger, or light a room. Households pay from 10 to 25 per-
cent at the time of purchase and finance the remaining balance through a loan 
from Grameen Bank.  
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In 2007, the CFU of the World Bank agreed to purchase carbon offsets gen-
erated from solar home systems for EUR 9 per tCO2e (Chhabara, 2008). The 
CFU (2008) predicts that 200,000 households will gain access to solar home 
systems by 2015 through this agreement, and that the project will generate over 
16,300 tCO2e per year. Each 50-watt solar home system will earn roughly EUR 
4.50 per year at this carbon price. Grameen Shakti is using these revenues to 
reduce unit costs and improve loan terms for households (Chhabara, 2008). 
Despite the positive externalities of some mitigation technologies, these products 
can be major expenditures for poor households. A biogas digester costs between 
USD 250 and 400 for households in Nepal, which is 25 to 40 percent of annual 
GDP per capita (CDM Executive Board, 2005; CIA, 2007). As a result, donors are 
experimenting with mitigation technologies that combine donor subsidies, house-
hold cash at point-of-sale, and microfinance (IIED, 2008). To the extent that mi-
crofinance is used instead of donor subsidies, the scalability and sustainability of 
these technologies may increase. In many cases a blend of cash, credit, and donor 
subsidies may enable households to purchase these products. 
If households can earn revenue from carbon markets for their emissions re-
ductions, they would have increased incentives to mitigate, including by pur-
chasing energy-efficiency technology. However, as examples in this chapter il-
lustrate, mitigating the carbon emissions of poor households through energy ef-
ficiency technology results in very low revenues per household from carbon 
markets. Poor households tend to consume very little energy in the home before 
gaining access to energy-efficiency technology. Instead of attempting to deliver 
payments such as the EUR 4.50 generated from solar home systems in Bangla-
desh (see Box 1), organizations like Grameen Shakti are using carbon offset 
revenues to increase access to microfinance for mitigation technologies at better 
rates (Chhabara, 2008).  
Revenues for the poor may be feasible for land use projects,11 which are rele-
vant to the GHG emissions of poor households. Smallholder agriculture can result 
in deforestation to create more farmland, overuse of natural resources and impor-
tant local ecosystems, GHG-emitting tilling practices, etc. Afforestation or refor-
estation projects on smallholder land are likely to go beyond the typical loan 
amounts of microcredit; therefore, these projects would probably have to attract 
the support of donors and/or the private sector.12  
                                                          
11 Many factors complicate mitigation projects involving land use in developing countries. 
These include established property rights, which are beyond the scope of this chapter. 
12 As an example, see the CFU project, “India: Improving Rural Livelihoods,” in which a 
paper company partners with local farmers to plant trees on marginal lands: 
http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Projport& ProjID=9636. 
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3.2 Summary Comments on Carbon Markets and Developing Countries 
This cursory review of the current state of carbon markets offers a few key les-
sons: 1) these markets are still in their early stages of development; 2) rules and 
regulations will play a major role in how these market evolve and the level and 
stability of carbon prices; and 3) although there are positive examples and pro-
gress toward using carbon markets to benefit the poor in developing countries, re-
sults to date are quite limited.13 But these markets should not be dismissed as be-
ing unimportant. They can complement any number of development projects and 
increase the income of poor households. 
Additionally, financing from carbon offset projects has the potential to enhance 
financial sector development. As illustrated, some mitigation projects could be 
sustainable and provide income for households and firms; however, converting to 
these emissions-reducing technologies may be too costly for poor households 
(Chapple, 2008). Currently, donors often subsidize these costs, though increasing 
access to credit for carbon mitigation investments may be a more scalable solution 
than funding individual projects. The potential for environmental finance to be-
come sustainable for poor households will depend on whether firms can profitably 
offer credit for mitigation projects. In turn, households would be likely to borrow 
for a mitigation project only if it increased household income or quality of life. 
Thus, the feasibility of sustainable environmental finance for poor households 
largely depends on the price of carbon offsets and the ability of firms in develop-
ing countries to enter carbon markets on behalf of households.  
If funds from carbon markets increase access to credit for carbon mitigation 
projects, these investments can also enhance financial sector development more 
broadly, increasing access to credit, savings, and insurance for rural households 
and firms. Rural banks and microfinance organizations active among the working 
poor are logical intermediaries, and their local involvement could be leveraged for 
environmental finance. Enhanced financial services for rural households may also 
facilitate mechanisms for adaptation, which are explored in the following section.  
Staying abreast of these developments and working to place these markets into 
a larger arena can be valuable for public and private decision makers considering 
projects that contribute to market development, a cleaner local environment, 
and/or the reduction of poverty.  
4 Adaptation Using Weather Markets 
Adaptation includes proactive efforts to prepare for expected long-term climate 
effects, such as improving coastal city infrastructure to prepare for rising sea levels 
(Müller, 2008). It also includes reactive adjustments to changing conditions such 
as in farming systems due to declining rainfall (Fankhauser et al., 2008; Lecocq 
                                                          
13 See Chapple (2008) for further discussion about including the poor in carbon markets. 
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and Shalizi, 2007). Adapting to change is a hallmark of the human experience and 
a normal behavioral response to emerging conditions (IPCC, 2007b; Morton, 
2007; Stern, 2006). Knowledge about changing conditions in weather and climate 
risk should improve public and private decision making and facilitate adaptation 
(Corbera et al., 2006; Morton, 2007).  
The effects of climate change will vary greatly by region (Lobell et al., 2008; 
Stern, 2006). Unlike mitigation efforts, which contribute to global reductions in 
GHGs regardless of where they occur, adaptation efforts are sub-regional and lo-
cal (Morton, 2007; Stern, 2006). Rising sea levels, higher temperatures, and more 
extreme weather events are among the commonly cited conditions that portend 
negative consequences for many sectors (IPCC, 2007a; Lobell et al., 2008; Stern, 
2006). Because adaptation depends on geographical and climate risks in a particu-
lar region, the cost and effectiveness of adaptation are less understood than those 
for mitigation (IPCC, 2007a; Morton, 2007).  
The adaptive ability of households, communities, countries, etc., is related to 
three major factors: 1) the extent to which climate change affects risk; 2) the 
presence of viable alternatives to current practices in the local context (e.g., can 
a farmer adopt new production practices given local conditions?); and 3) the 
ability to change behavior — determined in large part by the level of economic 
development, information and technology available to those most affected by 
climate change.  
Adaptation is critical in developing countries, yet an obvious challenge is that 
the poor are the least equipped to adapt. Around 75 percent of the rural poor are 
engaged in some form of farming, making their livelihoods vulnerable to climate 
change (Anderson, 2002). The poor tend to live and farm on marginal lands and 
have less access to infrastructure that can protect against increasing weather risks. 
This makes them even more vulnerable to the negative consequences of climate 
change, reducing their options for viable livelihood alternatives (Nicholls et al., 
2007; Stern, 2006). In addition, the poor are less able to make important behav-
ioral changes such as technology adoption due to high opportunity costs (IPCC, 
2007a; Skees and Collier, 2008). At the macro level, the least developed countries 
and regions are often less able to adapt to climate change than developed coun-
tries. At the micro level, poor households in developed and transitioning econo-
mies are often less able to adapt. 
Many basic adaptation investments must be funded by governments, which 
may be aided by donors and multinational organizations. These public investments 
include infrastructure development (levees, water systems, health facilities, etc.), 
and safety net programs for catastrophic weather events. These investments should 
increase the availability of viable alternatives for vulnerable households and firms 
through agricultural research and development (R&D) investments, education and 
technical training or retraining (Fankhauser et al., 2008).  
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4.1 Adaptation and Insurance 
Insurance facilitates adaptation efforts (Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC). Using insur-
ance to reduce risk facilitate adaptation is consistent with the efforts of insurers 
who require improved building standards or other risk reducing activities as a pre-
condition for certain types of coverage. For example, in areas prone to earth-
quakes, insurers may require that properties meet building codes and pass inspec-
tions before they are approved for cover. Likewise, insurance companies may give 
discounts to homeowners who purchase fire extinguishers or who live near a fire 
station. These links between insurance and risk reduction are far easier to enforce 
in developed countries than in developing countries.14  
Weather insurance can help households in developing countries engage in ad-
aptation efforts. First, the price of insurance can provide policy makers, house-
holds, and donors an estimate of the cost of risk, which can in turn prompt adapta-
tion investments. Insurance prices are based on the expected losses of the insured. 
If the effects of climate change increase risk, the price of insurance will rise. Ob-
taining an explicit price for weather risks can provide stakeholders with new in-
formation about risks. 
The insurance response to weather risks across time and space has significant 
potential value in prompting adaptation strategies. Underlying this model is the 
recognition that the cost of weather risk must be paid somewhere in the system 
— either directly by those most, such as households or firms, or by govern-
ments, donors or NGOs that intervene after a major weather event. The price 
may be very high in terms of human suffering, destruction of productive assets 
and the increased incidence of chronic poverty, government bailouts, disruptions 
in economic growth, etc.  
For example, consider a situation where maps of flood risk along a river dem-
onstrate that a particular area will be subjected to catastrophic flooding that could 
completely destroy property in that area in one out of every three years. Consider-
ing only the expected losses, an insurance product would cost at least 33 percent 
of the value of the property insured each year.15 If decision makers understand that 
this risk is effectively uninsurable, the commitment to invest in alternative adapta-
tion efforts may become more palatable. Making the cost explicit drives the point 
home: many of the most damaging aspects of climate change are simply not insur-
                                                          
14 The high cost of monitoring risk-reducing behavioral changes or investments diminishes 
the ability of insurers to provide these incentives in most developing countries. Infra-
structure investments — both at the micro level (e.g., in irrigation systems) or at the 
macro level (e.g., in levies for coastal communities) — are one exception that is rela-
tively easy for insurers to corroborate. 
15 In addition, insurers must include many other costs (e.g., costs of delivery and adminis-
trative costs) that will raise the price of insurance even higher. 
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able. These problems require other solutions such as building dams or relocating 
households and firms. 
Second, if the event is insurable, cash payments from insurance payouts can 
help households to adopt new livelihood strategies. The ability of the poor to 
adapt is often limited. As a result, poor households may be better able to make 
marginal adjustments in response to climate change if they have indemnity 
payments. The fact that households receive these payments after experiencing an 
extreme loss may be a potent incentive, encouraging them to adapt to the expo-
sure they face.  
For example, our experiences include extensive work in livestock insurance in 
Mongolia. During the difficult years following the exit of the Soviets in Mongolia, 
many people resorted to herding animals as a source of livelihood. When extreme 
winter storms resulted in large livestock losses at the turn of the century, many 
herders were forced out of herding and had to find new livelihoods. In this sce-
nario, insurance payments could be used to protect herders who continue to herd 
and to facilitate transitions to new livelihoods. 
Third, insurance can be bundled with alternative production technologies, if 
there are any. For example, insurance has been bundled with loans for technologi-
cally advanced seed in Malawi (Hess and Syroka, 2005). The insurance product 
covers the value of the loan. If drought occurs and farmers experience low yields, 
the loan can still be repaid (Alderman and Haque, 2007). As a result, farmers gain 
access to higher yield seed. This model could be enhanced and used in adaptation: 
1) to the extent that R&D advancements can provide seeds resilient to emerging 
climate change effects (e.g., reduced rainfall), these seeds could be sold to farmers 
through insurance-backed loans; 2) beyond repaying the bank, the insurance could 
be expanded to provide insurance payouts to cover household losses. 
4.2 Weather Markets 
Weather markets are important for considering how insurance can enhance adapta-
tion in developing countries. First, we focus on weather index insurance, a 
weather market mechanism that is gaining popularity in developing countries. 
This insurance is flexible, offering a number of ways to protect household income 
and assets from catastrophic weather risk. Weather index insurance has primarily 
been used as a form of agricultural insurance, but it is relevant for almost any 
business that is affected by extreme weather risk. The fact that weather index in-
surance has primarily been used for agriculture makes it particularly promising for 
the poor in developing countries, because agriculture is the predominant liveli-
hood of their households. Weather index insurance may be particularly relevant 
for climate change; many climate change effects result in differing weather condi-
tions, including those that have profound consequences for farming. 
Next, we suggest that innovations in actively traded weather markets may ad-
dress challenges facing weather index insurance. In particular, actively traded 
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weather derivatives have blended risk transfer markets and capital markets to obtain 
more efficient product pricing. Significant limitations currently prevent a blending 
of risk and capital markets for weather index insurance. However, investments that 
facilitate weather index insurance markets may also facilitate a convergence with 
capital markets. Learning from such innovations should improve the ability of 
weather index insurance programs to more efficiently manage challenges in pric-
ing these products, given the uncertainty associated with climate change. This ex-
planation of weather markets in developing and developed markets will be impor-
tant for the discussion in the final section of the chapter regarding the potential for 
climate insurance. 
Weather Index Insurance 
Weather index insurance is a new tool that shows promise in developing coun-
tries. Traditional forms of agricultural insurance have been tried in developing 
countries for many years with little success (Hazell, 1992). Beyond the typical 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems16 associated with traditional insur-
ance, transaction costs (e.g., underwriting and loss adjusting) have proved to be 
too high for smallholder agriculture in developing countries. Feasibility studies 
of this problem began in the late 1990s. Weather index insurance uses a measure 
of a weather event as a proxy for losses. For example, weather index insurance 
that protects farmers from drought was introduced in India in 2003 (see Box 2). 
Payouts were based on the level of rainfall at the closest weather station (Manua-
morn, 2007).  
Weather index insurance should have lower transaction costs than traditional 
agricultural insurance because it avoids farm-level information problems: moral 
hazard, adverse selection, and individualized loss adjustment make traditional in-
surance so difficult to implement affordably. As a tradeoff to reduce costs, 
weather index insurance increases basis risk — the possibility that the insured’s 
losses will not match the level of payout determined by the weather index. 
Weather index insurance has higher basis risk than traditional insurance because 
no individualized loss adjustment occurs. Rather, it relies on the weather index to 
determine payouts; increasing the likelihood of a mismatch between insurance 
payouts and losses of the insured. As a result, weather index insurance is appro-
priate only for insuring correlated weather risks — weather events that tend to af-
fect a large geographic area in roughly the same way. 
                                                          
16 Adverse selection — the fact that the insured know more about their risk than the insurer 
— and moral hazard — the tendency of the insured to engage in riskier behavior after 
purchasing insurance — are problems for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance programs. For a 
review and analysis see the World Bank Report on Agricultural Insurance in China, 
2007. 
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Box 2: Drought Insurance in India 
In 2003, BASIX (a microfinance institution), in a partnership with ICICI Lom-
bard (an insurer) and supported by technical assistance from the World Bank, 
introduced rainfall-index insurance to address high default rates and to increase 
lending opportunities in rural areas. BASIX conducted a pilot study that sold 
weather insurance to 230 farmers in Andhra Pradesh that was designed to protect 
against drought during the groundnut and castor bean growing season.17 
BASIX improved its rainfall insurance program operations and extended its 
regional scope. It also improved accessibility by reducing costs of delivery by 
simplifying the underwriting process and training loan agents to sell index in-
surance.  
Almost every season, BASIX has improved the insurance product according 
to farmer feedback. For example, BASIX added coverage against excess rain 
during the harvest season, and made their rainfall insurance policies more 
flexible by insuring any crop — farmers can purchase a certain level of liability 
and plant whatever they wish. 
Due to the success of BASIX’ 2003 pilot program, other insurers began 
selling rainfall insurance in 2004. AICI, the state-sponsored insurance com-
pany of India, has become the largest seller of weather index insurance, sell-
ing 675,000 policies in 2007/2008. One explanation for the growth of AICI is 
that farmers who receive loans from the state bank are required purchase ag-
ricultural insurance.  
Despite the rapid expansion of weather index insurance, market penetration 
remains very shallow (India has 300 million farmers). Adequate meteorological 
infrastructure has limited further expansion. Public and private investments are 
being made to overcome this constraint.  
Many weather index insurance programs rely on government and/or donor in-
volvement to fund start-up costs, including technical assistance and education for 
the target market and facilitating new partnerships among private- and public-
sector stakeholders. These include facilitating relationships between insurers, de-
livery agents, reinsurers, data collection offices, etc. (See Figure 1 for a schematic 
of key stakeholders for weather index insurance programs). For some projects, 
donor support has focused on developing the capacity of local stakeholders, such 
as insurers and delivery agents, to manage the weather index insurance program so 
that donor support plays a diminishing role as the program expands. For other pro-
jects, donors may have to be involved for an extended period. Prolonged donor 
involvement may be a consequence of low local familiarity with insurance, or it 
may be due to the sophistication of product design or program structure.  
                                                          
17  Modified from GlobalAgRisk (2007); Manuamorn (2007) provides much of the detail 
for this case study and is an excellent source for additional information. 
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Fig. 1. Stakeholders for Weather Index Insurance 
Source: Authors 
The World Bank and the governments of Mexico and India have been the largest 
supporters of weather index insurance. The World Bank typically engages in a 
weather risk assessment to determine if insurance is a suitable solution, and if the 
partner is a local insurer with the potential capacity to manage the program. These 
programs often require establishing delivery channels, improving insurance laws 
and regulations,18 and establishing risk financing through international reinsur-
                                                          
18 Most often, the largest legal and regulatory constraints are to persuade a country’s insur-
ance regulator that weather index insurance is a legitimate form of insurance. Two is-
sues that are often of concern for regulators are 1) that insureds receive payouts corre-
sponding to the loss, and 2) that individuals purchasing the insurance have an “insurable 
interest.” Regarding the former, basis risk does create the possibility that the insured 
may suffer a loss and receive no payout; however, other forms of insurance (e.g., tradi-
tional crop insurance) also have basis risk. The important point for regulators is that they 
be able to evaluate whether the index on which payouts are made is a suitable proxy for 
the losses the insurance contract is meant to cover. Regulators could benefit from the 
development of international guidelines to enhance their ability to make this assessment 
(Carpenter and Skees, 2005). 
Regarding the latter, “insurable interest” standards are meant to ensure that people 
purchasing the insurance are managing risk rather than engaging in speculation. Regula-
tors are better able to assess that the target market has an insurable interest if it can be 
shown through historical data that the weather index is correlated with revenues for the 
target market. 
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ance. Marketing and educational requirements for the target market, which is typi-
cally rural smallholders who have little or no experience with insurance, are also 
significant.  
Educating the target market is important for weather index insurance programs. 
Gaining familiarity with insurance products and learning to evaluate their costs 
and benefits take time. Where training and marketing were done on a very limited 
basis, sales were so low that pilot projects were discontinued after the first year.19 
Weather index insurance programs have used townhall-style meetings, focus 
groups, advertising, and individualized training to inform households about 
weather index insurance. Pilot programs provide important experiences that build 
credibility for the insurance product, provided that households in the region have a 
positive experience with it. 
Many recent tests of weather index insurance focus on households engaged in 
agricultural production. Innovative delivery mechanisms are also being tested, in-
cluding composite products that link insurance to credit or goods and services in 
the agricultural value chain, such as seed or fertilizer. In principal, weather index 
insurance can also be sold directly to lenders or rural firms in agricultural value 
chains having revenues that are affected by the weather. Helping these rural firms 
can help the poor by increasing access to credit or to the agricultural value chain. 
Governments and donors can also purchase weather index insurance to support 
relief efforts for natural disasters. For example, Mexico has a weather index insur-
ance program that funds state-level relief efforts when drought occurs. 
This flexibility results in many innovative approaches and promising market 
growth, as decision makers continue to explore how weather index insurance can 
best be used to address weather risk in developing countries. Our work has 
evolved to focus on designing weather index insurance products for rural firms, 
which we have done in Peru and Vietnam (Skees, Hartell, and Murphy, 2007). 
Targeting these firms creates opportunities for weather index insurance coverage 
in areas where it is too difficult and costly to target households. Weather index in-
surance products for firms should establish a market that can expand to include 
more rural stakeholders, including households.20 Almost thirty pilot tests for 
weather index insurance have occurred in developing and transitioning countries 
(see Appendix A). Initial experiences with weather index insurance indicate that 
these products have the potential to create access to insurance in developing coun-
tries where it has not previously been available (see Skees et al., 2007). 
                                                          
Other legal and regulatory conditions are also important to the long-term sustainabil-
ity of weather index insurance markets (e.g., risk financing and marketing standards). 
Because several weather index insurance programs exist, some important legal and regu-
latory precedents are in place and may be helpful for stakeholders interested in develop-
ing weather index insurance markets. 
19 See a previous paper prepared for KfW (Skees et al., 2007) for further description of 
weather index insurance markets. 
20 See Skees, Hartell, and Murphy (2007) for more on this approach. 
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Challenges for Weather Index Insurance  
Although weather index insurance shows promise, many challenges remain in the 
scalability of these programs. These include delivering products to remote house-
holds, informing the target market, establishing appropriate legal and regulatory 
standards, and the availability of appropriate weather data.21 Although the transac-
tion costs of weather index insurance are usually lower than those of traditional 
forms of agricultural insurance, insuring weather risk for the poor in developing 
countries is not straightforward. Product affordability is a constant concern. Even 
when poor households recognize the serious weather risks they face, their oppor-
tunity cost of purchasing insurance is high. Many of the innovations in this market 
therefore involve efforts to reduce the premium cost. As experience with weather 
index insurance increases, some of these costs will decrease. In the meantime, 
governments and donors will continue to support weather index insurance pro-
grams, financing start-up costs and designing products that work within the con-
straints in areas where the risk can be insured at prices affordable to the target 
market. Two challenges are discussed in more detail below. 
First, large R&D costs are required to create weather index insurance. Since 
these products must be highly tailored to local conditions, R&D costs cannot be 
spread across large areas. Two major components of R&D costs are finding suffi-
cient weather and loss data and analyzing those data to determine the structure and 
pricing of the insurance product. Tailoring weather index insurance to local condi-
tions constrains their scalability. Unlike microfinance, which has relied on a hand-
ful of business models to dramatically expand access to credit and savings on a 
global scale, weather index insurance requires a much greater variety of product 
and program structures to address the myriad weather risks and their conse-
quences. There are also a number of regions where weather index insurance pro-
grams would be relatively ineffective, as in mountainous areas where the major 
weather risks are not highly correlated across the target market.  
As a result of these limitations, institutions interested in implementing weather 
index insurance programs22 need professionals with a variety of specialized train-
ing, including training in risk assessment, product design and risk financing. Pri-
vate-sector stakeholders in developing countries can and are learning these skills, 
                                                          
21 For a more comprehensive review of these challenges see Skees (2008). 
22 Legal and regulatory standards often prevent microfinance institutions and other organiza-
tions that offer savings and credit from underwriting weather index insurance contracts. 
When a weather shock occurs, these institutions experience capital shortages due to loan 
defaults and savings withdrawals, putting them in a poor position to make insurance pay-
outs. Thus, these rural financial institutions cannot simply expand their business to under-
write weather risk as well. In contrast, these financial institutions may be able to sell 
weather index insurance as a delivery agent for an insurer. In this capacity an insurer, not 
the credit/savings financial institution, underwrites the insurance product. The bank can 
bundle weather index insurance with credit or savings products. This is the generalized 
case: such product linkages ultimately depend on local legal and regulatory standards. 
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often with technical assistance from donors. These capacity building investments 
should benefit many households as insurers are able to expand the variety of in-
surance products offered. 
Second, weather index insurance products require international risk financing. 
Weather index insurance insures spatially correlated risk — everyone in the region 
may suffer from the same loss event. Insurers selling weather index insurance 
therefore require careful financing.  
Risk financing typically comes from reinsurers in international risk transfer 
markets. Reinsurers create tailored — over-the-counter (OTC) — contracts for 
each insurance program. Such OTC contracts are expensive to create and pose ob-
stacles for reinsurers who must still understand the weather risk and local market 
in the developing country, often with limited historical data and inadequate regula-
tion governing insurance markets. From the perspective of insurers, reinsurers 
writing OTC contracts have significant control over the price of the product the 
insurer wants to sell; if no suitable reinsurance agreement can be made, the insurer 
may not be able to market the product. OTC reinsurance contracts for catastrophic 
risks have well-documented limitations that include the lack of transparent pricing 
and cycles in insurance pricing that follow major catastrophic events (Jaffee and 
Russell, 1997). As a result, alternative risk financing structures would be required. 
Progress in alternative risk financing has occurred in another part of weather mar-
kets — weather derivative markets. 
Weather Derivative Markets and Their Relevance for Developing Countries 
Actively traded weather derivative markets emerged in the United States in the 
late 1990s following deregulation of energy markets (Brockett, Wang, and Yang, 
2005). Energy companies wanted to manage the risk of extreme temperatures that 
could adversely affect their profits (Russ, 2004). (For example, a heating oil dis-
tributor in the northeast US will lose revenues if winter temperatures are warmer 
than normal for an extended period.23) Extreme patterns of either cold or hot tem-
peratures were calibrated into an index of heating or cooling degree days and 
packaged into financial instruments — weather derivatives — that offset the re-
duced revenue or increased costs of energy that accompanied outliers in weather 
patterns. Weather derivative markets continue to grow quickly — in 2007/2008 
the notional value of contracts traded in weather derivative markets was USD 32 
billion, a 76 percent increase over the previous year (WRMA, 2008). 
Weather derivatives are best suited for large and sophisticated firms in devel-
oped countries. They are poorly suited to the smallholders and rural businesses 
common in developing countries. Issues of regulation, market volume, and trans-
action costs constrain the use of weather derivatives in this context (Skees et al., 
2007; Skees and Collier, 2008).  
                                                          
23 See Russ (2004) for a more specific example. 
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But weather derivative markets are relevant to our discussion in two ways. 
First, reinsurers are key stakeholders in these markets, which allow reinsurers to 
leverage innovations that would improve the weather index insurance market. In 
the fall of 1997, the first weather derivative OTC contracts were traded by large 
energy firms (Brockett, Wang, and Yang, 2005). However, the management ex-
perts designing these contracts were soon hired by reinsurance firms wanting a 
larger stake in weather markets. Reinsurers are actively engaged in weather index 
insurance and weather derivatives.  
Second, weather derivative markets quickly expanded to include standardized 
exchange-traded products on capital markets,24 providing valuable lessons in po-
tential alternative risk financing structures for weather index insurance.25 Because 
obtaining affordable risk financing remains a challenge for weather index insur-
ance programs, such advancements could be important for increasing access to 
weather index insurance. As with weather index insurance products, creating OTC 
weather derivative products is expensive, because the index and associated pricing 
model have to be developed or at least adapted for the circumstances of the buyer. 
To reduce these costs and expand the market to smaller firms, the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange initiated futures and options contracts in 1999 based on tempera-
ture indexes, which has expanded to financial exchange markets for major cities in 
the United States and Europe (Brockett, Wang, and Yang, 2005). 
Bringing natural disaster risks into capital markets creates the opportunity to trade 
or securitize the risks with many buyers (Doherty, 1997; Skees, 1999). When ex-
change-traded securities can generate sufficient market volume, more efficient price 
discovery occurs. Additionally, exchange-traded products are dynamically priced, 
meaning that the value of the security can fluctuate as new information emerges. 
Capital markets could create more efficient financing of weather index insur-
ance in developing countries. However, the tailoring required for a weather index 
insurance product would probably not generate sufficient market volume to trade 
on an exchange. Financing weather index insurance through exchange-traded se-
curities is not currently practicable for developing countries. Furthermore, in areas 
with underdeveloped financial sectors, the infrastructure, regulatory environment, 
and experience with exchange markets are all likely to be inadequate to support 
exchange-traded instruments. 
                                                          
24 “Capital markets” generally covers a wide range of activities. It is used here to recognize 
that catastrophic risk products could take a variety of forms including derivatives, secu-
rities, or catastrophe bonds. The focus in this chapter is on standardized products that 
can be traded on an exchange market (e.g., the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). OTC 
products may look very similar to exchange traded products. However, they are not as 
well regulated and the price is negotiated, rather than being the result of the bids of 
many buyers and sellers. 
25 We discuss a possible convergence for exchange-traded products and weather index in-
surance in Section 4 of this chapter. Exchange trading may help weather index insurance 
overcome some of the problems that climate change creates for these insurance products 
discussed in Section 3.3. 
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The potentially important role of reinsurers and capital markets in weather 
markets in both developed and developing countries should not be underrated. Re-
insurers continue to advance innovative financing structures for natural disaster 
risk transfer products, such as securitization of natural disaster risks (Swiss Re, 
2006).26 Among these activities, reinsurers help to establish a financial architec-
ture in developing countries that can facilitate a future convergence of weather and 
capital market innovations.27 
4.3 Climate Change and Weather Index Insurance 
The previous section described weather index insurance and outlined the potential 
benefits of insurance to facilitate adaptation. In this section, we discuss specific chal-
lenges for implementing weather index insurance programs in the context of increas-
ing weather risk due to climate change. This discussion is based on the following: 1) 
in principal, weather markets can protect against increasing weather risk; 2) with in-
creasing weather risk comes higher premium costs; 3) some policy responses to 
higher premium costs (such as premium subsidy) can undermine the primary advan-
tage of weather markets, which is pricing the risk; and 4) weather markets cannot 
protect against long-term climate change trends. Here it is important to note that 
weather index insurance protects against correlated risks: even small losses can cre-
ate large insurer liabilities because many insured households will require payment at 
the same time. As a result, insurers must be very careful when evaluating the risks 
that they are insuring in order to organize appropriate financing.  
If climate change increases weather risk, the price of weather index insurance 
will increase, significantly affecting the ability of poor households to buy these 
products. The price of insurance will increase for three primary reasons: increases 
in pure risk, the potential size of losses, and the ambiguity of the risk. 
Increasing Pure Risk 
The fundamental element in the price of insurance is the expected losses the in-
surer is likely to pay. Insurers use historical data to develop probability distribu-
tions that predict the likely frequency and severity of future losses — also called 
the pure risk. For weather index insurance, the pure risk is the weather risk for 
which the insurer is liable. When insurers find trends of increasing weather risk in 
historic data, such as would occur with climate change, they project these trends to 
devise their estimates of pure risk for the period they are about to insure. Climate 
change can affect two aspects of the pure risk. 
                                                          
26 Catastrophe (CAT) bonds are another example (Doherty, 1997). 
27 Interestingly, WRMA (2008) notes the expansion of the weather derivatives market in 
India, Latin America, and Southeast Asia in 2007/2008, which provides some anecdotal 
evidence of how weather markets already converge. 
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First, if the frequency of catastrophic weather risks is increasing, the variance 
of the probability distribution will increase. Because insurance underwrites ex-
treme events, the expected losses will increase. To accommodate this, insurers 
must raise the price of insurance. 
Second, if average weather conditions become riskier (e.g., a decline in average 
rainfall), the central tendency or median of the probability distribution will shift 
toward the events of concern. Because the majority of events occur around this 
central tendency, this shift implies a fundamental change in the weather risk and 
significantly increases the expected losses of the insurer. Failure to estimate the 
central tendency can quickly put an insurer out of business. As a result, insurers 
must raise the price of insurance substantially to accommodate this change — no-
ticeably more than in the case of increasing variance. 
Increasing the Potential Size of Losses 
Whether the central tendency is shifting toward more risk or if the variance of the 
distribution is increasing, insurers worry that losses may be more severe than in 
the past. In this case insurers increased the catastrophe load — a component in the 
price of insurance that allows insurers to build reserves quickly to cover large 
losses. 
Increasing the Ambiguity of the Risk 
Beyond adjusting the pure risk and increasing catastrophe loads, insurers charge 
“ambiguity loads.” These are an additional cost added to the premium to reflect 
the possibility that insurers may underestimate future losses. For example, climate 
change could affect weather risk in a particular region, causing an insurer to mis-
estimate the weather risk. When the risk is changing, the likelihood of misestimat-
ing the central tendency increases; thus, if insurers expect that the effect of climate 
change in a region is increasing the weather risk, they are likely to raise ambiguity 
loads greatly. 
At any given time it is extremely difficult to determine if risk is changing. For 
example, consider an insurer who experiences an extreme loss or a series of ex-
treme losses in a single year. This loss could indicate that weather risk is changing 
(e.g., that the variance of the distribution is increasing) or it could simply be the 
type of low frequency, high severity event accounted for in the probability distri-
bution (e.g., a 1-in-100 year flood). 
While our focus on climate change has been in the context of anthropogenic con-
tributions, there are also natural phenomena that contribute to changing weather pat-
terns. When insurers examine historical data, they must make assumptions regarding 
the distribution of past weather events — are extreme events explained by the prob-
ability distribution? Is climate change affecting the probability of losses? Is this 
change part of natural oscillations in the climate, or do any or all of these changes 
indicate longer-term, more permanent anthropogenic climate change? Insurers’ con-
clusions will affect the price of insurance. For example, from the insurer’s perspec-
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tive, either cause of changing weather patterns will be ambiguous regarding the as-
sessment and pricing of the underlying risks. Still, the uncertainty of potential an-
thropogenic climate change is likely to be greater than that of historic climate pat-
terns and can translate into higher ambiguity loads. Thus, different insurers may 
price the risk differently, based on their assumptions. 
Summary 
As scientific understanding of the impacts of climate change progresses, espe-
cially the impacts at regional and sub-regional levels, insurers should be able to 
leverage this information to improve their estimates of pure risk and to minimize 
ambiguity loads.  
Providing insurance products for the poor at prices they can pay is very difficult 
because of the constraints of accessibility and market failure. It should therefore 
be obvious that climate change poses a significant challenge to creating sustain-
able weather index insurance products for the poor. 
4.4 Climate Change, Weather Index Insurance, and Subsidies 
This challenge and the potentially significant advantages of introducing weather 
index insurance in areas where adaptation is warranted have led some observers to 
suggest subsidies. However, experience with insurance indicates that unless subsi-
dies are carefully planned, they can reduce incentives to adapt.28 
To illustrate, consider the effects of a crop-specific insurance subsidy on 
household incentives. In general, households recognize when their risks are in-
creasing, especially if the central tendency is shifting. These conditions create 
incentives to adapt in order to preserve income. Yet when governments or do-
nors subsidize premiums for an increasingly risky livelihood (e.g., cotton farm-
ing in a region with insufficient and declining rainfall), it can distort the price 
signal generated by insurance. As a result, households may try to maximize their 
income by receiving government subsidies and remaining in an unsustainable 
livelihood rather than making the difficult transition to a more sustainable live-
lihood. Thus, household adaptations are delayed; this is ultimately likely to be at 
great costs to governments or donors.29 
Other, more carefully-planned, subsidies — such as subsidizing coverage of the 
most extreme risk — may be less likely to distort adaptation incentives, but these 
measures are largely untested. Instead, governments and donors can make signifi-
                                                          
28 Many lessons can be learned from poorly planned agricultural insurance subsidies in 
developing countries. A hallmark of these programs is that they provide incentives to 
take more risks at the expense of the government. For more on this subject, see Good-
win, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004) or Skees (2001). 
29 Experience with subsidizing insurance premiums indicates that the total cost of these 
subsidies tends to grow over time with high opportunity costs for developing countries. 
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cant contributions in public investments that facilitate the development of weather 
index insurance. Other market solutions are also possible, such as promoting in-
surance regulation that expands the range of insurance products. Good public in-
vestments that facilitate weather index insurance, such as improving weather sta-
tion infrastructure and the availability of weather data, may also have significant 
advantages in addressing climate change by improving information systems that 
enhance public and private adaptation planning. 
5 Are Climate Markets Possible? 
Thus far, we have provided context for the importance of weather insurance as a 
tool for adaptation in developing countries. We have also made a distinction be-
tween weather risks and climate risks — weather risk being year-to-year vari-
ability and climate risk being the risk of significant changes in weather patterns. 
Generally, weather products are available only for events one year in advance, 
yet even these products must be priced using the best estimates of climate 
change effects on the pure risk (Skees, Barnett, and Collier, 2008). No markets 
yet exist to trade climate risk, i.e., the longer-term expectations regarding impor-
tant weather variables. 
This section makes the case for markets trading climate risk, and provides ba-
sic concepts for creating climate markets. Stakeholders still have to pay for the 
expected losses associated with climate change impacts which are included in 
the premiums for products sold on climate markets. Moreover, climate markets 
will provide a hedge against the risk that losses will be greater than expected. 
Climate markets are relevant to adaptation efforts for the poor in developing 
countries because they could 1) provide useful hedging mechanisms that allow 
insurers and reinsurers supplying weather index insurance to reduce ambiguity 
loads; 2) serve decision makers planning longer-term adaptation investments 
who want to hedge against extreme scenarios in future climate change effects; 3) 
improve pricing signals for public and private decision makers planning longer-
term projects (e.g., infrastructure investments); and 4) provide additional, im-
mediate economic incentives for research to improve the measurement and the 
ability to forecast and model climate change. We describe how creating a market 
that can hedge against climate change for short-term weather risks is a necessary 
first step toward creating a market to hedge against longer-term climate change 
effects. We also suggest creation of such a market based on ENSO (El Niño 
Southern Oscillation).30  
                                                          
30 ENSO cycles include warming (El Niño), cooling (La Niña), and neutral southern Pa-
cific conditions (McPhaden, 2003). 
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5.1 Short-Term Climate Markets 
Section 3.3 describes how insurance suppliers set insurance prices, based in part 
on their assumptions about the effects of climate change on the insured risk. In-
stead, if important risks thought to be affected by climate change could be traded 
on an exchange market, the interaction of buyers and sellers having their own 
views about weather patterns would converge on a price for weather risk.  
Moving from an abstract “climate market” to the actual steps to create such a 
market is daunting and beyond the scope of this paper. Some basic preconditions 
for a climate market are that 1) there is a standardized index to be traded; 2) that 
the index has both negative and positive effects (e.g., in the vernacular of futures 
markets — that there are natural long and short positions); and 3) that there is 
enough volatility in the index to stimulate participation in the market among those 
exposed to the risks and speculators who provide liquidity in futures markets.31 An 
ENSO index potentially meets all these conditions. 
Trading ENSO 
El Niño — the part of the ENSO cycle with the highest impact — is a climatic event 
that affects weather conditions on a global scale. El Niño events occur roughly every 
three to seven years and last for twelve to eighteen months. El Niño results from the 
complex interaction of trade winds, atmospheric pressure, and sea surface tempera-
tures (SSTs). It impacts global circulation patterns, resulting in a variety of effects 
including drought in Australia, Indonesia, southern Africa; heavy rains in Peru and 
equatorial East Africa; warmer temperatures in Canada, the U.S. Northeast and 
southern Brazil; and a reduced incidence of Atlantic hurricanes (McPhaden, 2003). 
As expected, these changes have many economic consequences. Perhaps the im-
pacts are most widespread in agricultural production, due to rainfall and temperature 
changes. Torrential rain destroys property and infrastructure and results in loss of 
life in northwestern South America (e.g., Peru and Ecuador). Pacific Ocean swells, 
sea surges, and intense rain cause significant property damage in highly-developed 
coastal regions of southern California. Additionally, fisheries in the equatorial Pa-
cific are affected by rising SSTs — the Peruvian anchovy industry collapsed due 
to the 1972–1973 El Niño (McPhaden, 2003). By contrast, the likelihood of hurri-
canes off the eastern seaboard of the United States declines as ENSO measures 
increase (AIR, 2008; McPhaden, 2003). Additionally, the fact that winters are 
warmer in North America and some other regions provides a benefit to offset 
many of the negative effects from strong El Niño events (McPhaden, 2003). Much 
uncertainty remains regarding the climate risk of ENSO patterns, which is of great 
significance given the importance of the ENSO cycle to climate change effects 
and the substantial economic costs of El Niño events (see Box 3). 
                                                          
31 In a futures market this volatility can be framed as uncertainty regarding the outcome of 
the index. In a context of climate risk and uncertainty, the critical variables are those where 
information is available about the underlying risk. However, some uncertainty remains. 
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Box 3: Is Climate Change Affecting ENSO? 
Because the occurrence of El Niño depends on SSTs and other climatological 
factors that are changing with much certainty due to climate change, the effects 
of climate change on ENSO cycles has been of some concern to researchers 
(Stevenson et al., 2005). However, the complexity of the ENSO cycle has lim-
ited researchers’ understanding of the effects of climate change on ENSO pat-
terns (Merryfield, 2006). Additionally, because ENSO is a leading source of 
climate variability, understanding ENSO patterns and how they might be af-
fected by GHG emissions is very important for assessing climate change ef-
fects more generally (Guilyardi, 2006; Hulme et al., 2001).  
Global circulation models produce differing conclusions regarding the ef-
fects of GHG emissions on ENSO: some project that ENSO patterns will re-
main the same over the next century, while others project a variety of changes 
in severity and/or frequency (Collins and CMIP Modelling Groups, 2005; Guil-
yardi, 2006; Merryfield, 2006; van Oldenborgh, Phillip, and Collins, 2005; Zelle 
et al., 2005). Differences in model outcomes depend on the many assumptions 
researchers must make regarding ENSO patterns and climate change. The ambi-
guity regarding ENSO redfuces the precision of global circulation models 
(Hulme et al. 2001; Merryfield, 2006; van Oldenborgh, Phillip, and Collins, 
2005; Zelle et al., 2006) 
ENSO insurance could have a variety of applications and has already moved be-
yond the conceptual stages. Khalil et al. (2007) demonstrate how and why an 
ENSO insurance product could be useful for the northern regions of Peru. The in-
surance regulator of Peru approved the use of ENSO index insurance as a result of 
some of our work in 2006 (Skees, Hartell, and Murphy, 2007). Osgood et al. 
(2007) also demonstrate how ENSO-based seasonal forecasting could be incorpo-
rated into weather insurance for farmers in Malawi.  
ENSO indexes are available in the form of Pacific SST data dating back to 1856. 
These are compiled and published monthly by the US National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). ENSO 1.2 is an index published by NOAA 
that measures SSTs off the coast of Peru, a particularly important location in ENSO 
patterns. Figure 2 plots a composite index of ENSO 1.2 anomalies from 1856 to 
2005. Clearly, positive anomalies (El Niño) occur more frequently and are more se-
vere than negative anomalies (La Niña). The El Niño events of 1983 and 1998 stand 
out as the strongest events in the last 150 years.  
An active exchange market could trade the composite ENSO 1.2 index in a 
number of ways. For example, the index could be the three-month moving aver-
age as presented in Figure 2. Traders actively engaged in the market would bet 
on the index. Any active exchange market on such an index, either increasing or 
decreasing contracts, would converge on an aggregated market forecast of future  
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Fig. 2. Composite ENSO 1.2 Index from 1905–2004 [Refer Dates to Authors] 
Source: Authors; based on NOAA data 
conditions. This price would incorporate information from myriad sources in-
cluding the effects of anthropogenic climate change on ENSO patterns over the 
life of the short-term (e.g., three-month) contract.32 Thus, an implicit market esti-
mate of the climate risk for ENSO would “naturally” emerge. Such pricing would 
reduce the climate change ambiguity regarding ENSO. This is achieved by insur-
ers by spreading the risk among the stakeholders taking different positions in the 
market. In this manner, climate markets are immediately relevant for hedging 
against current climate change effects.  
Short-term markets act as the foundation for a longer-term climate market be-
cause they create volume and familiarity with the risk being traded. For longer-
term products, the climate risk becomes a larger determinant of the price of the 
risk management product. 
                                                          
32 Roll (1984) found that the pricing of orange juice futures outperformed the US National 
Weather Service in predicting short-term Florida temperatures. Roll describes how or-
ange juice futures pricing integrates many sources of information, including short- and 
long-term temperature forecasts from the National Weather Service. 
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5.2 Toward a Longer-Term Climate Market 
A short-term ENSO index market may be adequate for improved pricing of weather 
insurance products. However, creating complementary exchange-traded ENSO con-
tracts could provide even more impetus for improved information about longer-
term ENSO trends. For example, trading a ten-year moving average ENSO 1.2 in-
dex could have many benefits and may be possible after a short-term market de-
velops. The trades could be actively rolled into the future and arbitraged with the 
short-term ENSO market to protect longer-term positions.  
Improvements in our ability to forecast changing climate and the associated ef-
fects on economic activity are likely to create exchange markets such as this hypo-
thetical ENSO market. It may also be possible to create climate markets for other 
regional sea surface oscillations. Active trading of global warming forecasts or 
possibly even sea levels may someday be possible. 
6 Conclusions  
Carbon and weather markets comprise a portfolio of mechanisms that address cli-
mate change. As carbon and weather market activity increases in developing coun-
tries, a key question remains: to what extent will the poor be included in these 
markets? Following is a summary and a look ahead examining several important 
factors that will affect how the poor can participate in these markets. This occurs 
as costs are redcuced and as coverage is increased. 
6.1 Improving Incentives to Mitigate Emissions 
The logical priority for mitigation efforts is to motivate big polluters in developed 
countries and large firms in developing countries to reduce emissions through 
emissions taxes, emissions allowances, etc. But the aggregated emissions pro-
duced by the poor — through inefficient energy practices, deforestation, etc. — 
are also significant. With a troubled world economy and over 2 billion of the 
world’s poor living on less than USD 2 a day (World Bank, 2007), it is also im-
portant to provide incentives for the poor to mitigate these effects, which should 
be designed to create new revenue and improve the quality of life for poor house-
holds. Efforts of UNFCCC and others are consistent with these conclusions.  
Additional R&D investments in small-scale technology, especially in agricul-
ture, would create more opportunities for the participation of the poor. The par-
ticipation of donors and governments interested in improving incentives for the 
poor to mitigate emissions should 1) promote increased opportunities for the poor 
to participate in carbon offset projects, (perhaps through a streamlined CDM re-
view process for carbon offset projects in the least developed countries; 2) ad-
vance new methodologies through the CDM approval process that are relevant to 
the poor (Chapple, 2008); and 3) invest in the development of emission-reducing 
technologies designed for poor households. 
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The price of carbon set by carbon markets is a critical factor in determining 
how the poor could actively participate in mitigation efforts. The successes of 
mitigation projects designed for the poor33 provide anecdotal evidence that they 
can benefit from these markets at current prices when these efforts are supported 
by donor coordination. Future demand for carbon offsets depends on the level of 
growth in the world economy and political outcomes. Of special importance is 
whether the United States will develop a mandatory carbon trading market and the 
carbon regulation standards of the EU after Kyoto expires in 2012 (Capoor and 
Ambrosi, 2008). Higher carbon prices are more likely to attract finance and ex-
pand opportunities for the poor. 
6.2 Seeding Credit for Mitigation and Adaptation  
For mitigation and adaptation, credit is crucial for households in developing coun-
tries. Mitigation and adaptation funding to seed environmental credit markets for 
the poor could advance efforts to increase their participation. If new livelihood 
strategies can improve their income, the poor would have natural incentives to 
adapt. Likewise, if carbon offsets can create a new income source or contribute to 
their economic development, the poor would have incentives to mitigate. Informa-
tion about climate change and mitigation and adaptation opportunities would im-
prove household choices and increase participation. 
A link between carbon markets and adaptation exists: two percent of payments 
for carbon offsets are paid into an Adaptation Fund. The intermediaries working 
between the poor and the carbon market have a strategic position to provide credit 
for mitigation and adaptation projects. Additionally, adaptation funds could foster 
weather index insurance markets by funding the start-up costs of offering access to 
data, financing product development research, etc. Donors and governments could 
provide seed funds designed to increase access to credit for these purposes. 
6.3 Transferring Intermediation to the Private Sector 
Because carbon and weather markets are organized on a global scale, the poor 
tend not to have access to these markets without an intermediary that can, for ex-
ample, leverage carbon market funds to finance loans for household mitigation 
investments. Governments and donor organizations currently act as this intermedi-
ary (Chapple, 2008). In the future, private-sector intermediaries could emerge and 
improve the scalability and sustainability of these markets in developing countries. 
Profitable private sector services to the poor can be extended more expeditiously 
than those dependent on the relatively limited budgets of donor organizations. Mi-
crofinance is a powerful example. 
                                                          
33 For examples, see 2.1. Clean Development Mechanisms: The Potential for Developing 
Countries. 
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Education and capacity building are central to the creation of suitable inter-
mediaries in the private sector. In carbon markets, multilateral organizations 
(e.g., the UNFCCC, World Bank) are already engaged in capacity building and 
carbon offset projects in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2007). As local stake-
holders gain increased experience with carbon markets through donor- and gov-
ernment-supported projects, the private sector is likely to play a larger intermediary 
role, organizing families for mitigation projects and packaging these projects for 
carbon markets. Some of this is already occurring. Education for carbon market 
opportunities to help the environment, improve the quality of life, and/or earn ad-
ditional income are likely to increase demand and energize the private sector. 
Educating households and building private sector capacity to manage carbon off-
set projects could be effective for governments and donors interested in increasing 
the participation of the poor in carbon markets. 
Increasing the links among the poor in weather markets is more complex. It is a 
goal of reinsurers, governments, multilateral organizations, and donors. Many in-
surers in developing countries lack the technical capacity to design these complex 
programs. Strategies that simplify the design process — such as more generic 
weather index insurance contracts — may be effective in transferring the owner-
ship of weather index insurance programs from governments and donors to the 
private sector. 
The complexities created by climate change may discourage insurers. Insurers 
understand that climate change increases risk in a general sense, while pricing the 
effects of climate change on a specific weather risk in a specific region is more 
difficult. Climate change research does not currently provide sub-regional and lo-
cal projections that are satisfactory to insurers. But even as climate change projec-
tions improve, insurers are not generally trained to evaluate new findings and their 
design implications. Climate markets can help address this constraint by pricing 
major climate risks. 
Donors and governments interested in increasing the scalability and sustainabil-
ity of mitigation and adaptation efforts for the poor should consider capacity 
building among private-sector stakeholders. Experience with weather index insur-
ance shows that capacity building can lead to local ownership of these projects 
and to market competition as successful programs expand over time in ways that 
help the poor can gain access to these markets. 
6.4 Creating Climate Markets to Facilitate Adaptation 
Short- and longer-term climate markets could address the capacity constraints of 
insurers planning for climate change, improving the competitiveness of their pric-
ing. While we have puzzled through an example of a short-term climate market for 
ENSO, it would be significantly more difficult to create longer-term climate mar-
kets. The motivation for creating active trading of important climate variables is 
to lower the price of weather insurance via more efficient and competitive price 
discovery that would improve access by the poor. Donors, governments, and the 
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private sector could use climate markets to hedge against large climate change ef-
fects. If these impacts were to occur, climate market payouts could fund invest-
ments to adapt to large climate change effects. Donors and governments interested 
in facilitating adaptation through climate market development can invest in R&D 
for products such as financial-exchange traded ENSO insurance. This would in-
crease access to weather insurance and improve the capacity of governments and 
donors to manage longer-term climate risks. These products insure against poten-
tial climate risks that would have significant impacts on the poor 
The activities we describe include increasing household access and incentives 
to participate in carbon markets, creating weather markets in developing countries, 
increasing the role of private sector intermediaries, and potentially creating both 
short-term and long-term climate markets. These factors should increase the par-
ticipation of the poor in carbon and weather markets and improve their ability to 
address climate change. 
APPENDIX: Summary of Index-Based Risk Transfer Products in 
Developing Countries 
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34 Estimate based on Manuamorn (2007) and personal communication between Jerry Skees 
and Kolli Rao of AICI, 29 March 2008. 
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Glossary 
Adaptation Efforts to adjust to the physical impacts of climate change, as 
related to increasing weather risk affecting agriculture, be-
havioral changes that reduce household vulnerability and/or 
exposure resulting in fewer farm losses.  
Adverse Selection Occurs when potential insurance purchasers know more 
about their risk exposure than the insurer, leading to partici-
pation by high-risk individuals and non-participation by low-
risk individuals. Insurers react either by charging higher 
premiums or not insuring at all, as in the case of floods. Ad-
verse selection is also referred to as anti-selection. See also 
Asymmetric Information. 
Ambiguity Loads An additional cost added to the premium to reflect the possi-
bility that insurers may underestimate future losses. 
Basis Risk A term generally used to reflect variance around a futures ex-
change price and a local cash price. In the context of index in-
surance, it refers to the difference between the loss as reflected 
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in the index versus the individual loss. Indexes rarely perfectly 
match individual losses. Some households experiencing loss 
do not receive indemnity payments and/or households that ex-
perience no loss receive indemnity payments. Basis risk in-
creases as the geographical area covered by the index expands. 
Asymmetric 
Information 
An information imbalance in a transaction in which one party 
possesses more or better information than another party or 
parties, such as knowledge of hidden costs or risky behavior. 
Buyers of insurance products typically have better informa-
tion about their level of risk exposure than do the sellers of 
insurance. Thus these buyers have incentives to hide infor-
mation to gain better terms for insurance in a way that will 
increase the probability of payout. See also Adverse Selection 
and Moral Hazard. 
Catastrophe 
Loading 
A component of the price of weather index insurance that 
accounts for the possibility of an extreme weather event oc-
curring in the early years in which the product is offered. 
Central Tendency The median or most frequently occurring value used by term 
insurers to describe a weather event.  
Climate Change Theory that overall weather patterns are changing on a global 
scale for the long-term due to human contributions to green-
house gases. 
Correlated Risk A risk or risks affecting many individuals or households in 
the same area at the same time, such as drought, which can 
damage agricultural production over an entire region, or a 
fall in a commodity price that simultaneously affects all pro-
ducers of the commodity within the same market. Correlated 
risk is also referred to as covariant risk and systemic risk. 
Derivative A financial instrument, traded on or off an exchange, having 
a price that is directly dependent upon or “derived” from the 
value of one or more underlying instruments. Examples in-
clude debt instruments, commodities, or any established pric-
ing index. Derivatives involve the trading of rights or obliga-
tions based on an underlying product, but they do not directly 
transfer underlying property. The derivative is merely a con-
tract between two or more parties. Its value is determined by 
fluctuations in the underlying asset. Derivatives can hedge 
risk or lock in a fixed rate of return. Derivatives are generally 
used to hedge risk, but they may be used for speculative pur-
poses. See also Hedging. 
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El Niño A warming of sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pa-
cific Ocean associated with dramatic changes in the weather 
patterns of the region and worldwide.  
El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) 
ENSO is an oceanic-atmospheric process that results from in-
teraction between the temperature of the equatorial Pacific 
Ocean and the atmosphere. Changes in the ocean affect the 
atmosphere and climate patterns around the globe. In turn, 
changes in the atmosphere impact the ocean temperatures and 
currents. The system oscillates between warmer than average 
(El Niño) and cooler than average (La Niña) conditions. 
Futures Contract A standardized agreement or the deferred delivery of a com-
modity, or its equivalent, traded through organized futures 
exchanges. The holder of the contract has the right and obli-
gation to buy or sell a commodity at a certain date for a price 
determined in advance. Most agricultural futures contracts 
require physical delivery, but some contracts such as feeder 
cattle futures contracts call for cash settlement at contract 
maturity. In fact, contracts are usually liquidated before de-
livery. Traders are classified as hedgers or speculators. Fu-
tures contracts have standard delivery dates, trading units, 
terms, and conditions.  
Index Insurance Index insurance makes indemnity payments that are not 
based on an assessment of the policyholder’s individual loss, 
but rather on measures of an index that is correlated with 
losses and serves as a proxy for actual losses. Agricultural 
index insurance products are based on area yields (where the 
area is some unit of geographical aggregation larger than the 
farm) and on products based on measurable weather events. 
See also Weather Index Insurance. 
Loss Adjustment The process of estimating actual losses after an insured party 
has filed a claim. 
Mitigation Efforts aimed at reducing anthropogenic contributions to 
climate change.  
Moral Hazard A change of behavior that increases the chance of loss be-
cause of the existence of insurance. Examples of moral 
hazard can range from poor management or carelessness to 
fraud, in the latter case specifically targeted at creating 
losses and collecting the insurance. See also Asymmetric 
Information. 
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Multiple Peril Crop 
Insurance 
MPCI is a form of traditional agricultural insurance, designed 
to insure against multiple crop perils. Most of the risks cov-
ered are weather perils (excess moisture, drought, freeze, etc.), 
and other perils such as fire can be included. Two forms of 
MPCI are dominant: 1) coverage is set based on expectations 
of the average farm yield, and payments are made if the indi-
vidual farm yield falls below some percentage of that average 
farm yield; and 2) losses are established based on an assess-
ment of the portion of damage to the crop. In either case, it is 
difficult to prove whether losses are from an insured weather 
peril or if they are the result of poor farm management prac-
tices. See also Traditional Agricultural Insurance. 
Over-the-Counter 
(OTC) 
The trading of financial instruments such as securities or de-
rivatives directly between dealers or their counterparties. OTC 
trading operates outside organized market exchanges.  
Premium The monetary sum payable by the insured to the insurer for 
the period (or term) of insurance granted by the policy. 
Probability 
Distribution 
(i) A function of a discrete random variable yielding the prob-
ability that the variable will have a given value.  
(ii) Outcomes of an experiment and their probabilities of oc-
currence. If the experiment were repeated a large number of 
times, the same probabilities should also repeat. 
(iii) A statistical function that describes all the possible val-
ues and likelihoods that a random variable can take within a 
given range. This range will be between the minimum and 
maximum statistically possible values, but where the possi-
ble value is likely to be plotted on the probability distribution 
depends on a number of factors, including the distribution’s 
mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. 
Pure Risk A component of the price of weather index insurance that es-
timates weather risk based upon the probability distribution. 
Reinsurance The shifting of part or all of the insurance originally written 
by one insurer to another insurer who is known as a rein-
surer. When the total exposure of a risk or group of risks pre-
sents the potential for losses beyond a limit that is prudent 
for an insurance company to carry, the insurance company 
may purchase reinsurance, i.e., insurance of the insurance. 
Reinsurance has many advantages, including (i) stabilizing 
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or evening out the financial performance of the insurance 
company over a period of time; (ii) limiting the exposure of 
individual risks and restricting or reducing losses paid out by 
the insurance company; (iii) the possibility of increasing an 
insurance company’s solvency margin (percent of capital and 
reserves to net premium income) and hence the company’s 
financial strength.  
Reinsurer A company that sells reinsurance. Commercial reinsurers of-
ten operate on a global scale, making them able to pool a di-
verse portfolio of large risks to reduce their overall risk ex-
posure. See also Reinsurance. 
Risk Financing The process of managing the financial consequences of risk 
through instruments such as insurance contracts, CAT (catas-
trophe) bonds, reinsurance, or options contracts. In this con-
text the authors use risk financing to describe the methods 




The surface temperature of the ocean. These temperature read-
ings are predictive of atmospheric pressure patterns. For ex-
ample, El Niño Southern Oscillation is associated with in-
creasing sea surface temperatures in Peru several months prior 
to the atmospheric change. 
Stakeholder A party who has a vested interest in the topic being discussed. 
For example, insurers, reinsurers, insurance regulators, deliv-
ery agents, households, etc., involved in an insurance program 
are stakeholders. 
Subsidy A direct or indirect benefit granted by a government (or do-
nor) for the production or distribution of a good or to sup-
plement other services. Thus, the term has a wide range of 
applications. In insurance for agriculture, premium subsidies 
occur when a government pays a portion of insurance premi-
ums for farmers. Premium subsidies, for example, often have 
unintended consequences, motivating farmers to take more 
risk at the government’s expense, resulting in larger and lar-




Insurance in agriculture has historically underwritten a spe-
cific crop on a specific plot of land. This insurance is priced 
by using historical farm yield data. In the event of a loss 
from an insured event, a trained claim agent will visit the 
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plot of land and assess the amount of damage incurred. One 
of the most common forms of traditional agricultural insur-
ance is multiple peril crop insurance. See also Multiple Peril 
Crop Insurance. 
Transaction Costs The financial or in-kind costs of business transactions, such as 
the cost or time spent obtaining information or permits. Trans-
action costs associated with insurance include those associated 
with underwriting, contract design, rate making, and monitor-
ing to control adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Underwriting Process of selecting risks for insurance and determining the 
amounts and terms the insurance company (the underwriter) 
will accept the risk. 
Weather Index 
Insurance 
Contingent claims contracts for which payouts are deter-
mined by an objective weather parameter that is highly corre-
lated with farm-level yields or revenue outcomes, such as 
rainfall levels, temperature, or soil moisture. See also Index 
Insurance. 
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